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BEGINNINGS
Constituting Wholes, Haunting, Plasticity
Manuele Gragnolati and Christoph F. E. Holzhey
Gragnolati / Holzhey
Beginnings
Wholes are said to be more than the sum of their parts. This ‘more’ 
contains both a promise and a threat. When different elements — 
which might be individuals, cultures, disciplines, or methods — form a 
whole, they not only join forces but also generate a surplus from which 
the parts can benefit. Being part of a whole is a way to acquire meaning 
and to extend beyond one’s limited existence; and having a part in the 
whole is to have an enlarged agency. But wholes are also more powerful 
than the sum of their parts. Wholes constitute their parts: they deter-
mine what is a part and what is apart, what can become a part, and 
which parts have no part. Even if parts therefore may not be said to 
pre-exist a whole, there may still be something in them that exceeds 
being a part — if only the possibility of being part of a different whole.
 While a desire for being whole or being part of a whole seems all 
too natural, organic metaphors — which are often used to think part–
whole relationships — have been criticized since they tend to naturalize 
relations of hierarchy and power. Yet entirely abandoning the whole in 
favour of the part(icular) is also problematic. After the disenchantments 
of the postmodern, post-cold-war period, and in the face of global cri-
ses — be they financial, economic, political, or ecological — there is a 
renewed urgency to the critical need for holistic perspectives. At the 
same time, there is growing concern that the ‘situatedness’ of any such 
perspective and the multiple, incommensurable ways of constituting 
wholes may be forgotten. 
 How are wholes differently constituted, and how do wholes consti-
tute, determine, and control their parts? Do ontological, epistemologi-
cal, aesthetic, and affective registers interrelate in different ways in 
material, symbolic, narrative, and psychological constructions? Can 
wholes emerge spontaneously from a collection of elements and their 
relations, from interactions or intra-actions? Does their constitution 
necessarily involve exclusion — not only of some parts and of other 
conceivable wholes but also of some aspects of the constituting ele-
ments? And insofar as exclusion involves loss or violence, to what 
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extent does it help to consider the totality of potential constitutions? 
From what position can this totality be postulated if not from a neces-
sarily partial perspective within? What is gained by shifting to notions 
such as complex systems, assemblages, entanglement, or hybridity? 
 These were some of the questions with which this book project 
began for most of the contributors, under the working title Constitut-
ing Wholes.1 For the editors, the questions emerged from a longer col-
lective and multidisciplinary inquiry into the possibilities of making 
tensions productive without constituting identities that either segregate 
into mutual indifference or confront one another in violent conflict.2 
 Several figures of thoughts have helped explore the critical poten-
tial and limits of productive tensions. Multistable figures, for instance, 
where the same thing can appear under radically different, incommen-
surable aspects, provide the metaphor for an intriguing limit-case of 
productive tension: observing such an object, different observers can be 
in profound conflict with one another until they experience a so-called 
Gestalt-switch, demonstrating the very different ways the same sense 
perception can be integrated into a Gestalt or whole.3 If Ludwig Witt-
genstein has shown how productive the experience of Gestalt-switches 
can be for philosophical investigations, the physicist Niels Bohr has 
proposed a principle of complementarity that functions in a similar way 
while arguably shifting from the psychology of sense perception or epis-
temology to an ontological level.4 Complementarity here is understood 
in a rather specific, technical sense implying not the relation of partial 
perspectives constituting parts that fit together harmoniously to form a 
whole but, on the contrary, the existence of mutually exclusive and thus 
contradictory descriptions that cannot be pictured together and yet are 
claimed to be equally needed for a fuller account.5 Taken in this sense, 
complementarity is a figure of incommensurability that resonates with 
sexual difference as conceived by Lacanian psychoanalysis insisting 
that ‘there is no sexual relationship’ or by Luce Irigaray speaking of 
‘the sex which is not one’.6 While a symbolic order that constitutes one 
sex as lacking conjures up the phantasm of completion through the 
other sex, sexual difference can also be understood as a figure of excess 
that disrupts all attempts at integration, oneness, or wholeness and 
keeps insisting as an open question.7 
 What must perhaps also remain open — if one wishes to retain the 
productive potential of tensions — is the question to what extent fig-
ures of thought can be abstracted from their original context and be 
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made to travel to other domains. Abstracting the figure of ‘wholes 
which are not one’ from that of ‘the sex which is not one’, for instance, 
may help us to think differently about not only sexuality, race, class, 
ability, or the particle-wave duality of quantum entities, but also the 
dissimilarities and non-equivalences in the constitution of different 
kinds of wholes.8 
 The starting point for this volume was thus the question of how 
wholes are differently constituted and how they in turn constitute, 
determine, and control their parts. Conjuring up this bidirectional con-
stitution, the working title Constituting Wholes was meant to present a 
figure maintaining the importance of aspect shifts, suggesting a rela-
tion of complementarity between irreconcilable perspectives, and 
thereby inquiring into the losses incurred in moments of synthesis, uni-
fication, or totalization. The aim was on the one hand to approach clas-
sical part–whole relations from a new angle but on the other hand also 
to focus on the asymmetry inhering in such relations, which the figures 
of multistability or complementarity may seem to downplay. In the pro-
cess of the year-long discussion leading up to this volume, the emphasis 
indeed fell on the power of wholes and on seeking ways of resisting and 
deconstituting them. 
 However, deconstitution need not mean destruction or full destitu-
tion. It can also include a process of (re)constituting wholes differently. 
This is a question not just of politics but rather, in the first instance, a 
question of the kinds of wholes considered, which in this volume range 
from organisms to history, from gendered, sexed, and raced selves to 
social classes, from individual art pieces to the sphere of art, from soci-
ety to the world. This list points not only to a large variety of wholes 
but also to the possibility of nesting them and thereby making them 
more ambivalent. Resistance to a whole is thus often thought of in 
terms of a part insisting on its partiality as not fully subsumable under 
the whole. However, does this imply conjuring up the part’s wholeness 
and identity — as something lost, as something to be constituted inde-
pendently from any relationship to the larger whole, or as the larger 
whole’s constitutive exclusion and condition of possibility? This sug-
gests that the logic and power of wholes persist in resistance or refusal 
just as much — although in different ways — as in attempts at repairing 
not only the parts but also the larger whole, making it fully whole by 
integrating the parts that have had no part. Wrestling with the ambigu-
ous functioning of wholes and the ambivalent attitudes towards them, 
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other figures of thought have come into focus while developing this vol-
ume, including loss, eclipse, dispossession, deflation, and expansion. 
But what has proved particular fruitful for the essays in this volume is 
to think with the figures of haunting and plasticity, both in their simi-
larity and difference.  These two figures share an emphasis on wholes 
rather than their putative parts. At the same time, they make it possible 
to highlight and conceptualize that a whole is rarely, if ever, all that it 
claims to be. It is indeed generally less than the sum of that from which 
it constitutes its parts.9 Like the intangibility of ghosts, this does not 
make it less real or effective. A whole’s power and violence lie rather 
precisely in its delimitations, hierarchizations, marginalizations, reduc-
tions, and exclusions. If this makes it necessary to focus on wholes — 
to identify them, and subject to critical inquiry that which from the 
whole’s perspective appears imperceptible — it does not imply an affir-
mation of wholes, let alone their reification. On the contrary, it requires 
partiality — but a partiality without parts. The interventions in this 
volume all embrace a partial perspective insofar as they do not pretend 
to present a view from nowhere.10 Yet they also resist speaking as or on 
behalf of a part that would be constituted as an identity or whole. 
Instead, they trouble the consistency and stability of wholes, breaking 
their closure and making them more dynamic without necessarily pre-
supposing or producing parts, an outside, or a teleological develop-
ment. 
 The figures of haunting and plasticity are equally ambivalent and 
contain multiple aspects that do not merely depend on the context at 
hand but can also coexist despite their apparent contradiction. If a 
haunted home is uncanny, unheimlich, it is because something happens 
secretly, heimlich, within the home, the Heim. Plasticity, in turn, evokes 
malleability, that is, a thing’s susceptibility to being shaped into all 
kinds of forms without it having an identity or will of its own. At the 
same time, the plastic arts produce sculptures that not only retain their 
shape but also impart it on others. What is more, (at least in French) 
one speaks of plastic as short for plastic explosives. 
 The social whole can be thought to be haunted by the ‘spectre’ of a 
radically different way of being organized and constituted, such as the 
spectre of communism that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously 
invoked at the beginning of the Manifesto of the Communist Party. 
When all those in power join forces to hunt down such a spectre, they 
acknowledge its power, but their accounts remain partial and need to 
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be opposed by other accounts — in the form of a part(y)’s manifesto, 
for instance — if the whole is to be destituted and reconstituted other-
wise.11 If haunting could here seem to be inscribed in a narrative that is 
teleologically oriented towards the future realization of a utopian alter-
native, the figure of haunting also troubles linear temporalities by high-
lighting the persistence of the past in the present and by involving argu-
ably always already a repetition — the coming-again of a revenant. 
Through their paradoxical entanglement or conflation of past, present, 
and future, of life and death, of matter and spirit, of absence and pres-
ence, ghosts challenge prevailing ontological assumptions and haunt 
any being. Arguing the ‘logic of haunting’ to be ‘larger and more pow-
erful than an ontology or thinking of Being’, Jacques Derrida indeed 
sought to displace an ontology of presence by what he called a ‘hauntol-
ogy’.12 As Colin Davis has noted, the work of Derrida differs from other 
hauntological approaches in that it is ultimately not interested in reveal-
ing, describing, and articulating — let alone realizing — what has been 
repressed into secrecy yet continues to haunt us. Instead, it mobilizes 
the spectre as a ‘deconstructive figure’ that does not merely destabilize 
what is taken for granted but lies outside the whole order of knowledge 
while opening us up to ‘the experience of secrecy as such’ and allowing 
‘an insight into texts and textuality as such’.13 Davis contrasts this 
approach to the work of psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok, in which phantoms are bound up with secrets that are unspeak-
able not due to a fundamental limitation of language and thought but 
rather in a more ‘restricted sense of being subject of shame and prohibi-
tion’. Here, phantoms are ‘gaps left by the secrets of others’, and such 
secrets ‘can and should be put into words so that the phantom and its 
noxious effects can be exorcized’.14 
 In parallel to these approaches, Avery Gordon’s Ghostly Matter: 
Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (1995) proposes haunting 
as a method that enables a critical engagement with social wholes 
beyond the strictures of positivism in sociology and anthropology. The 
book ‘looks for a language for identifying hauntings and for writing 
with the ghosts any haunting inevitably throws up’.15 Challenging how 
disciplinary boundaries are drawn between ‘the study of literature 
(story/fiction) and social science (fact)’,16 it breaks open the relative 
autonomy or wholeness of separate disciplines. While her intervention 
into sociology draws much of her material from literature — such as 
the novels Como en la guerra (He Who Searches) by Luisa Valenzuela 
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and Beloved by Toni Morrison — Gordon makes it clear that she is not 
concerned with ‘Literature as such’ but with social life.17 Acknowledg-
ing the importance of resisting the ideal of impartial objectivity, she 
highlights:
[T]ruth is still what most of us strive for. Partial and insecure surely, and 
something slightly different from ‘the facts,’ but truth nonetheless […]. 
But truth is a subtle shifting entity not simply because philosophy says 
so or because evidentiary rules of validation are always inadequate, but 
because the very nature of the things whose truth is sought possesses 
these qualities.18
Her argument is thus that the object of social science is characterized 
by a specific shiftiness or ghostliness, and it can be known and written 
only with a ‘method attentive to what is elusive, fantastic, contingent, 
and often barely there’, that is, ‘in the mode of haunting’.19 Indeed, she 
suggests that ‘haunting is a constitutive feature of social life’ and that it 
is necessary to find ways ‘to be haunted and to write from that loca-
tion’. This does not mean becoming a well-constituted part within a 
social or disciplinary whole: writing from a haunted location ‘is not a 
methodology or a consciousness you can simply adopt or adapt as a set 
of rules or an identity’. Yet the point is to be partial: ‘We ought to do 
this not only because it is more exact, but also […] to the extent that we 
want our writing to change minds, to convince others that what we 
know is important and ought to matter’.20
 In order to get a better sense of the paradoxical way in which 
haunting involves wholes that are partial without constituting parts, a 
brief consideration of one of Gordon’s case studies may be helpful. Gor-
don notes towards the end of her analysis of Valenzuela’s novella that 
the story must be told ‘in the mode of haunting’ both because the story 
‘is happening in and through haunting’ and because haunting is imag-
ined to be an effective way of political mobilization (of the middle 
class). The context is the practice of ‘disappearance’ — the secret and 
officially denied abduction, torture, and usually death of people — 
during the Argentinean military regime of the late 1970s and the strat-
egy of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo to resist the regime in weekly 
demonstrations carrying pictures of their disappeared children. In Gor-
don’s analysis, haunting spreads over several levels. In a most direct 
sense, the disappeared have a ghostly existence insofar as the state’s 
denial means that they hover between life and death, making it impos-
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sible for their loss to be mourned by those left behind. While the uncer-
tain fate of the disappeared thus haunt their loved ones, Gordon also 
argues that ‘disappearance is a state-sponsored procedure for producing 
ghosts to harrowingly haunt a population into submission’, that is, to 
haunt not only the relatives and friends of the disappeared but society 
as a whole.21 At the same time, the strategy of control through system-
atic disappearance requires maintaining a delicate balance of knowing 
and not knowing. Disappearance must be a ‘public secret’ of which 
enough is known to terrify everyone ‘but not enough either to have a 
clear sense of what is going on or to acquire the proof that is usually 
required by legal tribunals or other governments for sanction’.22 The 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo used ‘the photographs to represent just 
this knowing and not knowing that is characteristic of disappearance, 
its terror and its political power’ and managed to turn it against the 
military regime, which became haunted in turn, as it were. While the 
junta ended up defining all disappeared as dead, the Mothers insisted 
on keeping the disappeared and their haunting alive. Although there 
could be no hope that the disappeared would return whole and alive, 
conjuring up their ghosts as ‘a symptom of what is missing’ meant to 
oppose the ‘false reconciliation that national-sponsored grieving for the 
dead […] promised’.23 What is more, it allowed for an encounter with 
the ‘specter of what the state has tried to repress’, which in Gordon’s 
analysis is ultimately not an individual or part but the utopian desire 
for a just world: 
Their capacity to see in the face of the disappeared, or in a photo of a 
face, the ghost of the state’s brutal authority and simultaneously the 
ghost of the utopian impulse the state has tried to suppress allowed the 
Mothers to understand that any successful political response to disap-
pearance had to get on the very ground of haunting.24
In her conclusion, Gordon returns to this paradox of haunting, which 
‘always harbors the violence, the witchcraft and denial that made it, 
and the exile of our longing, the utopian’, and she highlights that the 
‘victorious reckoning with the ghost’ — which ‘registers’ a degraded 
present and ‘incites’ towards a future of plenitude — ‘always requires a 
partiality to the living’.25
 The notion of haunting that contributions to this volume mobilize 
more or less explicitly resonates with Gordon’s in many ways. In partic-
ular, haunting is conceived less in view of an ‘alternative ontology’ — 
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no matter how ‘disjointed’ and ‘non-foundational’ —  than as a method 
for exploring how objects, processes, and affects make themselves 
known in other than obvious terms.26 Insistently pointing to forms of 
historicity, violence, and dispossession, haunting disrupts the natural-
ness of evidence and the transparency of ‘things’, knowledge, or experi-
ence. In so doing, haunting troubles, interferes, and scrambles linear 
constructions. Facts, stories, and events inhere with traces, symptoms, 
cathexes, and drives that break through the diachronic flow of history. 
Neither time nor space remains intact when the tactility of everyday life 
is mediated by the labour of the negative. Indeed, thinking through 
hauntings haunts you back. It suggests an aporetic immanence that 
obfuscates any capacity for a totality or whole. Informed by psychoana-
lytic, feminist, queer, and postcolonial perspectives, the figure of haunt-
ing envisaged in this volume seeks less to ‘enlighten’ the shadow realms 
of knowledge production, experience, and relation, than to trouble 
them with the material manifestations and temporal traces of the 
unforeseeable, the unknown, the absent, and the invisible. The concern 
lies in searching for the uncanny visitations, the unintelligible events, 
the unuttered voices, and the nonsensical remnants in methods, 
archives, and systems of justice, desire, and death.27 
 Taking the figure of haunting as a method has the potential of rad-
ically disrupting wholes through the paradox that their consistency can 
be diminished by ‘adding’ to them, that is, by insisting on the persistent 
traces of the lives, things, and possibilities that have been lost, gone 
missing, and excluded in the often violent process of a whole’s constitu-
tion. On first sight, it would seem that the figure of plasticity presents a 
lesser challenge to wholes insofar as it evokes malleability, that is, the 
ability of a thing to undergo continuous transformation without ever 
losing its integrity, wholeness, and thus also identity. However, it is 
only the numerical identity that is here retained, and while the figure of 
haunting emphasizes the persistence of the past in the present and for 
the future, the figure of plasticity makes it possible to account for 
changes that irreversibly lose any trace or memory of the past. 
 The notion of plasticity has recently gained prominence in a diverse 
set of fields and discourses, from biology to deconstructionism, from 
semantics to the neurosciences. It abandons the assumption that whole 
and part mutually determine or strain against each other, thus chal-
lenging, for instance, both the idea that the whole is constituted 
through subsumption and that this force can or ought to be resisted 
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according to a logic of exemption or excess. Plasticity instead reveals 
the radically transformative nature of the immanent and hence inextri-
cable processes of the giving and receiving of forms, thus inviting us to 
consider the question of wholes beyond the classical dichotomies of 
components and composites, medium and form, identity and difference, 
inscription and erasure. While the figure of haunting also goes beyond 
these classical dichotomies, the figure of plasticity provides a different 
angle on the question whether it is possible to proceed not from a con-
sideration of the ‘constituting’ (of the) whole but from its de-constitu-
tion in morphosis.28 
 Plasticity is a notion that has been put forward particularly force-
fully by Catherine Malabou, whose work also demonstrates the 
remarkable ‘plasticity of the concept of plasticity’.29 Malabou began ‘to 
form the concept of plasticity’ in her book The Future of Hegel: Plas-
ticity, Temporality and Dialectic (2005 [1994]), which identifies Hegel’s 
manifold use of the term. Malabou has shown how plasticity always 
carries the double meaning of ‘a capacity to receive form and a capacity 
to produce form’ and is tightly associated with dialectical processes, 
especially of self-determination and self-formation.30 It becomes a 
‘name for the originary unity of acting and being acted upon, of spon-
taneity and receptivity. A medium for the differentiation of opposites, 
plasticity holds the extremes together in their reciprocal action.’31 Ulti-
mately, plasticity also provides the condition for Malabou’s own proj-
ect, which we might describe as trans-forming, stretching, and mould-
ing a part so that it may hold (together), comprehend, and constitute a 
whole: 
To ‘form a concept’ in the sense intended here means first of all to take 
up a concept (plasticity), which has a defined and delimited role in the 
philosophy of Hegel, only in order to transform it into the sort of com-
prehensive concept that can ‘grasp’ (saisir) the whole.32
Relying on the plasticity of concepts, which allows her ‘to elaborate as 
a whole all the instances of the Hegelian concept of plasticity’ by vary-
ing it in both extension and intelligibility, Malabou has thus arrived at 
a concept of plasticity that justifies her own operation performed ‘in the 
future of Hegel’s thought’ and that can be said to be ‘the point around 
which all the transformations of Hegelian thought revolve, the centre of 
its metamorphoses’.33 
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 In her subsequent work, Malabou has further ‘elaborated’ the con-
cept of plasticity by engaging with notions of being and time (Heideg-
ger), différance and writing (Derrida), Levinas’ ethics of the Other, the 
death drive (Freud), and brain plasticity in neuroscience.34 Tracing a 
history of the concept of plasticity from Hegel to the present, her book 
Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruc-
tion (2010) argues that ‘the concept of plasticity gradually asserted 
itself as the style of an era’ and that it did so over and against writing as 
theorized by Derrida in an ‘enlarged’, ‘transformed’, and ‘modified’ 
sense of ‘archewriting, that is, the general movement of the trace’.35 
 The concept of plasticity is so plastic that it seems capable of 
absorbing, holding together, and organizing everything without leaving 
anything apart. Indeed, Malabou has referred it to the ‘spontaneous 
organization of fragments’, has seen it ‘endowed with a “dithyrambic 
gift for synthesis”’, and concludes Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing by 
proposing ‘closure’ as the focal object for a changed philosophical per-
spective.36 The incorporation of neuroscience is part of this aspect shift, 
for if plasticity is ‘establishing itself as the paradigmatic figure of orga-
nization in general’, it is neuroplasticity that provides ‘the most con-
vincing example’.37 In particular, Malabou maintains that the ‘neuronic 
has become the paradigm to think what the social is’, that is, in partic-
ular, society as a closed but plastic structure.38
 However, it would be misleading to present Malabou’s work as 
aiming at and embracing an all-encompassing enclosure. Instead — and 
this is what makes her notion of plasticity particularly suggestive for 
the present volume — Malabou has proposed plasticity as an answer to 
the im/possibility of fleeing a closed system — a whole — which has ‘no 
outside, no “elsewhere”’. Envisaging the possibility of ‘escape within 
closure itself’ and of the ‘formation of a pathway as a “way out” in the 
absence of a “way out”’, she has named ‘“plasticity” the logic and econ-
omy of such a formation’ and has defined it as ‘the form of alterity 
without transcendence’.39 
 The point is not merely that the ‘mutability of beings is what opens 
a future in the absence of any openness of the world’.40 Rather, plas-
ticity offers a way of describing mutability beyond the paradigm of 
traces that are written or imprinted. As Malabou clarified at the end of 
her book, the ‘impossibility of fleeing means first of all the impossibil-
ity of fleeing oneself’, and it is the plasticity of the brain that she takes 
as metaphor for thinking a way out where there is no outside.41 An 
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important element in her argument for the philosophical necessity of a 
new materialist thought ‘replacing grammatology with neurology’ is 
the insight that ‘neuronal traces don’t proceed as do writing traces: they 
do not leave a trace; they occur as changes of form.’42 
 The paradox of a trace that leaves no trace becomes clearer in the 
books The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage (2012) 
and Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity 
(2012), in which Malabou addresses irreversible personality changes 
due to brain damage. Whatever occasions a transformation of the 
brain, it can certainly be said to produce a trace, but in doing so it can 
also erase past traces, or rather deform past transformations. Whereas 
Freud imagined the perceptive apparatus to work like a ‘Mystic Writing 
Pad’ that produces a palimpsest conserving all past traces,43 the brain 
imagined by Malabou is both more dynamic and fragile. Elaborated in 
reference to not only brain lesions from head traumas but also illnesses 
like Alzheimer and even ordinary ageing conceived not only as a pro-
cess (involving a loss of plasticity) but also as an instantaneous event 
(which she links to explosive plasticity), her notion of destructive plas-
ticity can hardly appear as a reassuring ‘escape within closure itself’. 
Malabou indeed has explicitly contrasted her notion of destructive plas-
ticity to the ‘always positive’ connotations of plasticity in science, medi-
cine, art, and education.44 
 However, she does not invoke the ‘fact that all creation can only 
occur at the price of a destructive counterpart’ in order to justify — in 
a manner that in many contexts could appear rather cynical — an 
opening up to future generations through a clearing of the present.45 
Instead, her work highlights that a transformation of the brain gener-
ally leads to the — plastic — formation of a new liveable identity,46 even 
as it implies the annihilation of a previous identity, and it can be experi-
enced with indifference and without suffering.47 
 Malabou has invoked Spinoza’s radically immanent Ethics as a 
rare instance of philosophy referring to ‘a destructive metamorphosis of 
the nature of a being, from whence a new being, who is in some senses 
a living-dead, is born’.48 While this sounds like the birth of a ghost, the 
point is that the new being is not haunted by its past nor spiritualized in 
any sense: ‘There is a destructive mutation that is not the transforma-
tion of the body into a cadaver, but rather the transformation of the 
body into another body in the same body.’ At least from the exterior, 
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such a transformation can even appear as progress, as Malabou implies 
when noting that for Spinoza,
even childhood appears to be a change of this sort, an originary change, 
a metamorphosis prior to reason, which also prevents us from thinking 
that the ill can fall back into childhood, since childhood is no longer the 
certain and solid term of regression, but rather another state of ourselves 
towards which it is fundamentally impossible to regress since it is not 
stable. We return nowhere. Between life and death we become other to 
ourselves.49
While Malabou quickly moves her focus onto the ill’s inability to 
regress, the implications are larger. Spinoza indeed suggested that the 
same discontinuity occurs in childhood so that any adult has become 
utterly other to his or her earlier state of being a baby.50 The possibility 
of destructive mutation thus offers an even more radical challenge to 
classical psychoanalytic practice than Malabou has suggested in the 
New Wounded, where she invokes the neurological account of brain 
damage as a change of form in order to argue for the need of ‘new 
forms of treatment that would no longer be based on the investigation 
of the past, the exploration of memory, or the reactivation of traces’.51 
 Ultimately, destructive plasticity appears less as an ambivalent 
zero-sum game — where the value of creation is measured by the price 
of destruction — than as a bi-stable figure in which the context deter-
mines the aspect perceived. According to Malabou, destructive plas-
ticity has
the power to form identity through destruction — thus making possible 
the emergence of a psyche that has vacated itself, its past, and its ‘prece-
dents.’ In this sense, such plasticity has the power of creation ex nihilo, 
since it begins with the annihilation of an initial identity.52 
Depending on whether one is attached or averse to what is to be 
destroyed, destructive plasticity thus offers a dystopian or utopian 
model for pure negation without affirmation, be it in a dialectic sense 
or in the sense of Freudian ‘negation’ (Verneinung), which maintains 
the trace of the repressed and therefore also always the threat or prom-
ise of a return.53 
 In many ways, plasticity appears as the antidote to haunting and 
vice versa. At the same time, both figures highlight the power of wholes 
and evoke different avenues of interventions that are partial without 
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relying on the construction of parts and their representation. Instead, 
they concern the whole as a whole, its consistency, its destabilization 
through addition of what it misses or has lost, or its destitution, which 
for better or worse coincides with the restitution of a (different) whole.
 All the essays in this volume deal with some aspects of haunting or 
plasticity, sometimes both, while often complicating their opposition 
and showing the specific and entangled ways in which they operate in 
different archives. The first essay is Volker Woltersdorff’s ‘Sexual 
Ghosts and the Whole of History: Queer Historiography, Post-Slavery 
Subjectivities, and Sadomasochism in Isaac Julien’s The Attendant’. It 
discusses the controversial concept of wholeness in historiography with 
regard to the fascination with past horrors and the desire to do justice 
to their victims who retain a ghostly presence. The essay retraces how 
this commitment produces a dilemma, as it can result either in the aspi-
ration to historical wholeness as full memoralization or alternatively in 
the radical rejection of wholeness as an impossible healing. Employing 
Elizabeth Freeman’s notion of ‘erotohistoriography’, Woltersdorff intro-
duces affect into the work of historiography in order to find an escape 
from the dilemmatic impasse between history’s wholeness as pacified 
reconciliation and as ongoing catastrophe along the lines of Walter Ben-
jamin. Sadomasochism is presented as a practice that may correspond 
most adequately to the paradoxical affect caused by traumatic history 
that continues to haunt the present. Indeed, re-enactments of historical 
oppression and violence occur frequently within the BDSM community. 
However, what distinguishes them from ‘living history’ re-enactments 
is their potential to modify affective attachments to history by altering 
the historical script. The essay elaborates this potential through Isaac 
Julien’s 1993 short film The Attendant, which, in a kind of queer re-en-
actment, overwrites the memory of colonial chattel slavery by a sado-
masochistic encounter of a black guardian and a white visitor in a 
museum dedicated to the history of slavery. The film raises the ethical 
and political question of how to relate affectively to the legacy and 
ongoing presence of racism. Against this backdrop, the author argues 
that, through the BDSM scenario and its changes to the historical 
script, Julien’s film represents and promotes a paradoxical way to per-
form both the memorialization and the forgetting of past horrors and 
pleasures. Here, historical wholeness acquires a conflicting double 
meaning of both achieving completeness and restoring integrity. Wolt-
ersdorff concludes by interpreting The Attendant as urging a utopian 
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perspective, produced by the tension between the impossibility of histo-
ry’s wholeness and the necessary, reparative desire for it. The article 
concludes by highlighting the paradox that Julien’s film shows whole-
ness ‘to be impossible and yet necessary’ and ‘expresses a necessary 
desire made impossible’. While the essay explicitly engages with the fig-
ure of haunting, one could perhaps speak here also of plasticity insofar 
as the contradictory conjunction of remembering and forgetting seems 
to rely on a malleability of affects and on producing an affective econ-
omy that sustains the fantasmatic remembrance of a painful past 
through paradoxical pleasure but breaks with any pleasure derived 
from real inequality, injustice, or suffering imparted non-consensually.
 Ruth Preser’s essay ‘Things I Learned from the Book of Ruth: 
Diasporic Reading of Queer Conversions’ performs another kind of 
queer appropriation of history. The Book of Ruth is a biblical narrative 
that opens with two women, Naomi the Israelite, a bereaved woman 
who wishes to return from Moab to Judea, and her no-longer-daughter-
in-law Ruth the Moabite, who pledges to follow Naomi, turning away 
from her gods and people. This laconic tale of nomadic intimacies and 
speech-acts of pledges and conversions has become an iconic narrative 
and a seminal text in Judaism, and it has also been appropriated by 
contemporary feminist and lesbian readings. Indeed, since it is not fully 
narrated but rather full of gaps, voids, and ‘ghostly matters’, the Book 
of Ruth provides apt ground and a malleable vessel for contemporary 
appropriation by stories seeking incarnation beyond linear or teleologi-
cal constraints. In Preser’s ‘palimpsest reading’, the biblical tale contin-
ues to communicate a story of successful assimilation of the poor and 
the foreign, and of a ‘home-coming’, but it is troubled by displacement, 
unresolved diasporic longing, and an acute and continuous sense of vul-
nerability. Thinking with Avery Gordon’s modality of haunting, Pres-
er’s reading aims to understand contemporary forms of dispossession 
and their impact, especially when their oppressive nature is denied. It 
reflects on what kind of theory might emerge by remobilizing the cate-
gory of ‘home’ through its de-constitution, through movement rather 
than destination, through disintegration rather than determination. 
Troubled by questions of race, nomadism, gender, and sexuality, in an 
era when (some) bodies may traverse national, sexual, and class bor-
ders, Preser’s investigation asks what happens to bodies that continu-
ously signify precarity and loss.
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 Similar concerns inform the questions that Eirini Avramopoulou 
asks in her essay ‘Claims of Existence between Biopolitics and Thana-
topolitics’. How is the desire for existence implicated in the experience 
of identity as wound? Under which conditions does the demand for 
desire appear to confront the repetition of trauma? Or else, what echoes 
in the last breath of someone dying? In Istanbul, a city built upon neo-
liberal structures of governance and cosmopolitan aesthetics, and 
defined by severe policing and local histories of ethnic and gender vio-
lence, these questions reflect upon a particular historical and political 
period through a personal story. The essay focuses on a transgender 
activist named Ali, his fight against transphobia, his illness and death, 
while reflecting on the 2013 public uprising in Istanbul following 
attempts by the Turkish government to demolish Gezi park. By explor-
ing the notion of spectral survival as a political praxis, it argues that 
this notion, rather than acceding to claims over a fuller subjectivity, 
mobilizes an aporia of de-subjectivation. De-constituting the ‘I’ here 
attests to an attempt neither to reconfigure its parts nor to merely per-
ceive life as dismantled, but rather to speak of a loss that no familiar 
language can yet describe. The spectrality of this ‘I’ troubles and repo-
liticizes, then, the very notion of haunting, as it lays claims to its own 
differing and deferral from the constitution of a proper name, or of a 
‘self’-acclaimed existence, especially when the fight for existence here is 
also a performative assertion of loss and death connected to processes 
of resisting sexist, neoliberal, heteronormative, and phallogocentric 
representations of possession and belonging.
 The de-constitution of the ‘I’ is also at the centre of Manuele Gra-
gnolati’s essay ‘Differently Queer: Temporality, Aesthetics, and Sexual-
ity in Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Petrolio and Elsa Morante’s Aracoeli’. The 
essay explores the relationship between temporality, aesthetics, and 
sexuality in the final novels of two twentieth-century Italian authors: 
Pasolini’s Petrolio (1972–75) and Morante’s Aracoeli (1982). Both nov-
els mobilize a form of temporality that resists a sense of linear and tele-
ological development and that instead appears contorted, inverted, and 
suspended. The article argues that both novels thereby allow for the 
articulation of queer desires and pleasures that cannot be inscribed in 
normative logics of completion, progression, or productivity. It shows 
how the aesthetics of Pasolini’s and Morante’s texts replicate the move-
ment of queer subjectivity and dismantle the traditional structure of the 
novel but do so differently. The fractured and dilated movement of 
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Petrolio’s textuality corresponds to a post-Oedipal and fully formed 
subject who is haunted by his complicity with bourgeois power and 
wants to shatter and annihilate himself by replicating the paradoxical 
pleasure of non-domesticated sexuality. Aracoeli, by contrast, has a 
‘formless form’ (‘forma senza forma’) that corresponds to the position 
of never completing the process of subject formation by adapting to the 
symbolic order. The poetic operation of Morante’s novel consists in 
staging an interior journey, backwards along the traces of memory and 
the body and at the same time forward towards embracing the partial-
ity and fluidity of an inter-subjectivity that is always in the process of 
becoming.
 Filippo Trentin’s essay ‘Warburg’s Ghost: On Literary Atlases and 
the “Anatopic” Shift of a Cartographic Object’ analyses the atlas as a 
method of assemblage in literary theory. It takes issue with the use of 
cartography advocated by proponents of a ‘spatial turn’ within literary 
studies, including Malcolm Bradbury’s Atlas of Literature, Franco 
Moretti’s Atlas of European Literature, and Sergio Luzzatto and Gabri-
ele Pedullà’s Atlante della letteratura italiana. While these atlases claim 
to dismantle the normative canon of historicism and to offer a different 
way of gathering knowledge, Trentin argues that they often risk repro-
ducing analogous positivistic, hierarchical, and colonizing assumptions. 
Showing a totalizing attitude embedded in modern atlases and in the 
‘cartographic reason’ emerging from the sixteenth century onwards, the 
essay proposes a speculative and heuristic use of the term ‘anatopy’ that 
aims to capture the disorienting potentialities that are intrinsic to 
non-cartographic explorations of space. In particular, it interprets Aby 
Warburg’s Bilderatlas Mnemosyne as an ‘anatopic’ object that keeps 
troubling any purely cartographic use of the atlas. In Trentin’s reading, 
by theorizing an anti-foundational (and anti-identitarian) method of 
knowledge organization based on the morphological affect between 
disparate images and objects, Warburg’s project leads to the profana-
tion of the atlas as a topographical machine and, with its recurrences, 
intervals, and voids, destitutes its traditional apparatus of power. This 
disparate and anti-holistic aesthetic disposition challenges the solid 
foundations of the constructions of historicism and cartographic rea-
son. It breaks up the technical explanation of cause and effect and sub-
stitutes it with a ‘danced causality’, which Trentin relates to Leo Ber-
sani’s idea of ‘aesthetic subject’ and the possibility of moving beyond an 
immobile and filial principle of identity formation towards a virtual 
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and impersonal one that is located beyond the ‘ego’, as well as beyond 
the rigid borders of cartographic reason and the linearity of positivistic 
historicism. 
 A different take on knowledge, history, and totalization is pre-
sented in Jamila Mascat’s essay ‘Hegel and the Ad-venture of the Total-
ity’, which aims at exploring the controversial notion of the Hegelian 
totality. Countering Louis Althusser’s critique of Hegel’s ‘expressive 
totality’, where every part is thought to expresses the whole, it proposes 
to consider such a speculative figure as a temporalizing instance situ-
ated at the entanglement of Knowing and History. Firstly, it illustrates 
the paradoxical inclination of Hegel’s totality to being both complete 
and a never-ending task. Secondly, it analyses the accomplishment of 
totality at the peak of the Science of Logic, focusing on the temporal 
circularity of the Concept (Begriff). Thirdly, drawing on the readings of 
Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyppolite, the essay 
illustrates the peculiar relation between becoming and eternity that is 
located at the heart of Hegel’s conception of time. Finally, it approaches 
the last section of the Phenomenology of Spirit devoted to Absolute 
Knowing in order to highlight the twofold movement of seizure 
(Begreifen) and release (Entlassen) that characterizes the activity of the 
Spirit and that is constitutive of the contingent ad-venture of the total-
ity as a philosophical achievement. In other words, it is by embracing 
contingency as its limit that Absolute Knowing reaffirms the status of 
its absoluteness precisely because of its capacity to sacrifice itself and let 
it go. Critically engaging with Catherine Malabou’s reading of plasticity 
in Hegel, Mascat highlights that Absolute Knowing is a process of 
totalization that entails cuts and interruptions. The essay shows that 
the Hegelian totality may be interpreted and actualized as a theoretical 
construct densely charged with temporal and historical implications: on 
the one hand, totality expresses a timely standpoint for thought — the 
standpoint of Hegel’s age, which is, as claimed by the philosopher at the 
end of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ‘for the time being 
completed’, as well as the standpoint of the present time to be specula-
tively accomplished; on the other hand, Hegel’s idea of a speculative 
totalization sets for the philosophies yet to come the never-ending task 
of constituting and re-constituting wholes. 
 A paradigm for thinking about wholes, their constitution and 
re-production, has long been provided by living organisms. While the 
emphasis is often on the relation between parts and wholes — between 
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the functionally differentiated organs and the organism, or, on a lower 
level, between cells and organs — Robert Meunier and Valentine Rey-
naud’s essay ‘The Innate Plasticity of Bodies and Minds: Integrating 
Models of Genetic Determination and Environmental Formation’ poses 
the question of the whole in biology with respect to the organism and 
its environment. A developmental system involves not only what we 
conventionally discern as the organism, that is, initially, the fertilized 
egg and the cellular mass arising from it by cell division, but also the 
physical and biological surrounding of the developing embryo. In the 
sense that not every aspect of the environment plays a role, the organ-
ism as part of the system constitutes this whole by determining what 
has an effect on the process and what does not. On the other hand, by 
not only enabling development or providing material but instead shap-
ing the process in specific ways, the whole of organism–environment 
interactions constitutes its part, i.e., the developing organism. If there 
are therefore different, potentially incommensurable constitutions of 
the whole developmental system, there are also different ways of identi-
fying the relevant units of selection in evolution, such as the living 
organism as a whole or the genes as the units of replication. In their 
essay, Meunier and Reynaud argue for a view on development and evo-
lution that integrates notions of environmental influence and genetic 
determination. The notion of plasticity that has recently gained cur-
rency in the life sciences seems to oppose genetic determination and 
innateness by underlining the importance of environmental influence. 
However, while morphological and cognitive development is indeed 
plastic and sensitive to the environment, the essay emphasizes that the 
mechanisms and elements enabling a system to respond to influences 
must be available for development to happen in the first place. These 
resources for development are not homogeneous ‘stuff’ that becomes 
formed by the environment through the course of development. Instead, 
they are highly structured and specific and thus enable specific 
responses to contextual conditions. Under varying conditions they will 
of course appear in different combinations and produce different out-
comes. Thus, they enable plasticity. And yet, as they are specific mecha-
nisms and elements, which mainly gain their specificity from the struc-
ture of the genetic material on which the environment can act, it 
appears appropriate to refer to them as innate.
 Considering organism and environment as a whole that both con-
stitutes the organism and is constituted by it and that is subject to evo-
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lution depending not only on the selection of genetic mutations but also 
on the organism’s innate capacity to undergo plastic transformation 
and produce novelty through large-scale variation, offers ways of inter-
vening into the long tradition of using organic metaphors in the descrip-
tion of other wholes, such as society and art. Arnd Wedemeyer’s article 
focuses on the German artist Joseph Beuys (1921–86), who did not shy 
away from describing the social order with traditional organic meta-
phors, such as the notion of a ‘central organ’. However, it is above all 
the — plastic — relationship between society and art that is at issue in 
Wedemeyer’s article, entitled ‘Pumping Honey: Joseph Beuys at the 
documenta 6’. Using the term ‘Soziale Plastik’, Beuys not only classified 
his own artistic practice as essentially sculptural but, more importantly, 
thematized its heterogeneous yet anything but passive relationship to 
art market, exhibition, museum, and various modes of reception, as 
well as staked its political claim. Wedemeyer looks at Beuys’s contribu-
tion to the 1977 documenta, ‘Honey Pump at the Workplace’, in order 
to argue that the layered invocation of plasticity characteristic of 
Beuys’s practice and theorizing ought not be historicized, as is com-
monly done, as an instantiation of the excessive, transgressive — and 
quite possibly disingenuous — zeal of the neo-avant-garde. Beuys’s 
‘Plastik’ should not be confused with anti-aesthetic formlessness, base 
materialism, a post-Duchampian ruination of the objet trouvé, and 
least of all a Neoromantic or Wagnerian projection or hypostatization 
of the autonomous work of art. The avant-gardes of the twentieth cen-
tury have rendered the relationship of art and aesthetics tenuous at 
best, their artistic ‘innovations’ straining against the supratemporally 
or anthropologically defined characteristics of aesthetic valuation, play, 
or force. While many have sought to address this problem by tethering 
art to society in a shared ‘contemporaneity’, the article explores the 
implications of recasting this relation as one of plasticity, using the con-
ceptual richness harvested by Catherine Malabou. 
 The volume closes with another essay focused on aesthetic produc-
tion, this time via the figure of the eclipse, which might be taken as the 
figure of a destructive plasticity that leaves no trace. Marcus Coelen’s 
essay ‘An Eclipse of the Screen: Jorge Semprún’s Scripts for Alain Res-
nais’ starts from the assumption that the peculiar status of film scripts 
(not written to be read as such) can be illustrated by the figure of their 
eclipse. For they are, in inverting the very logic of the figure they invite, 
eclipsed for the sake of and by the fractured light on the screen they 
 
 G R A G N O L AT I  /  H O L z H E Y
26
help to produce. Yet just as the sun, obscured by the ‘black writing’ of 
the moon, leaves an ephemeral contour in the skies — a spectacle to 
many when happening — so too can the script that is made to disap-
pear by the screen be assumed to draw its own particular and even 
more vanishing traits into the movie that is given not only to sight but 
also to thought. The analyses and critical constructions proposed by 
Coelen try to detect such traits in the work of Jorge Semprún the screen 
writer. Writing not only for movies by Alain Resnais — most notably 
La guerre est finie (1966) and Stavisky (1974) — but also publishing 
versions of them after their release and calling those versions ‘scénarios’ 
despite various divergences and subtly violent inversions of the movies’ 
images, the screenwriter’s figure describes yet another twist of the 
eclipse. It can be assumed not only that Semprún strongly resisted the 
influence of the constellation formed by writing and cinematographic 
shooting, as well as projecting, but furthermore that this writing was 
almost imperceptibly yet essentially directed against the eclipse it was 
drawn into. No minor forces are conjured up in this enterprise. Driven 
by the desire to re-appropriate cinema’s a-personal and anti-psychologi-
cal movement, to domesticate the images of scribbling lights drifting 
away from the mental and into thought — as well as into a history not 
mastered —, Semprún attempted to shape mastery itself and most tradi-
tional forms of authorship, along with memory and agency, in order to 
cloud the eclipse of script — that is, we might add, to conjure up a 
ghost recovering the trace of what has been eclipsed so that it may con-
tinue to haunt.
This volume emerged from, and is strongly informed by, the weekly dis-
cussions of the research colloquium at the ICI Berlin Institute for Cul-
tural Inquiry within the frame of its 2013–14 research focus ‘Constitut-
ing Wholes’. We would like to thank all the postdoctoral fellows for 
their active engagement in shaping the joint research project. In addi-
tion to the fellows contributing to this book, these were Daniel Barber, 
Alice Gavin, Peta Hinton, Nahal Naficy, and Stefano Osnaghi. Fur-
thermore, we would like to thank Claudia Peppel, Luca Di Blasi, and 
the rest of the ICI Staff for their input and assistance. We are also very 
grateful to Takesada Matsutani for agreeing that we use his painting 
Gravity (2012) for the book’s cover, and to Ming Tiampo for making 
us discover the artist and liaising with him. Finally, we would like to 
thank Lisa Y. Gourd for her careful copy editing of the volume.
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53 See Freud’s ‘Negation (1925)’, in Standard Edition ixi: 1923–1925, pp. 235–42; 
and Malabou’s discussion of different types of negation, especially in the sixth 
section of The Ontology of the Accident, pp. 73–91.
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